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,1bslrar:l- Stream d:ll:lbasc s}'stems are de.~igned 10 supporl
the ra.~l on-line processing lh:ll Chllr.lderizes manJ lIew emerging
applications such a~ pCf'\':lsi\'C computing, scnsor-ba.~ed enviroll-
mcnts, on-line business Ilfoccssing amI nclwllrk monitorinl:. The
sensilil'c mllure of the d:lla and the high-demands emirOllmenl
where data nm he 1051 or dropped IJCCllUSC of limited buffer slor-
nge or real-time cnmlminls. rC(luire robllst security mechani.~ms,
i.e. mechanisms that nol onl}" pro\idc scruri!)" sen"ices, bUI flrc
:llso faull-Iolerant.
In Ihis paper we idelllif}' the securilr requirements for dat;]
strenm s}'slenL~, focusill~ on Nile a dala stream mana~emcnt
s)'stcm. We present a new method, j<~r-RC4, thai pro\ides
emdent lind faull-tolenmt d;]tll confidentiality. We dl'monstr:lle
its lIpplicabiJit)' to data streams br \lsin.!: it as building block in
the design of a sccuntr architeClUre for Nile :md by prtoscnting
results for 11 stream based application.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet revolUlion. and more reeenlly the wide-sprelld
use of wireless and sensur networks. created n pnmdigm shift
in the way infonnaliun is <leeessed and processed, generat-
ing new applicalions such as real-time nelwork monituring.
survcill<lnee. tmcking, plant maintenance, telecommunications,
data managemelll and envirunmemal monilOring, to name
just a few. Such applicmiuns arc fundamentally different in
lhe way they output dam and perform queries lIJ. Thus.
lhey continuously produce large volumes of data (streams)
obtained from the environmenl they opemte in. Dnta Slre<lms
can he ohtained from mulliple sources at high-arrival (possibly
unpredictable) rmes. They arc continuous and unbounded. The
transitive chamcteristic of data makes the complete storage and
processing impossible. In tum. dala may he summarized and
stored only temporarily for proccssing.
The queries applied on such data streams are also differ-
ent from traditional dlllnbnse llueries. They are not snapshot
queries. but rather continuous queries in which the same query
is repeatedly evaluated each time Ilew input arrives. Severnl
queries can be registered in lhe syslem and different levels
of priority can be defined for each query. As resources are
a concern, highest priori I)' queries' requirements arc served
firs\. while low priority queries may receive answers lhat
arc an approximation of the correct results. To overcome the
infinite nalllre of datn streams. the processing is perfonned on
windows of data. Queries C<ln specify the size of the windows
'Illd thc frequency of the result.
Sevcral syslellls were designed to cope with the require-
ments of data stream databases. Exnmplcs include: STREAM
[2J. Aurora [31 and Aurorn* [4]. and Nile [51, [6].
A. Securiry Requirelllems fur Data Srream Systellls
Mnny of the data stream applications operatc over Internel
and/or wireless communication networks nnd arc thus exposed
to numerous threals such as:
Atwcb 011 data il/le~rit)': data can be injel.:led or modified
ilnd it is not in tlle originnl fonn <IS intended hy the sender.
or originally stored. Data corruption can he due to faults
as well as to malicious actions.
• Arracks 011 dala cOlljioell/iafif)' (1110 primcy: hy eavesdrop-
ping of communications channels, or bypassing thc access
control ,lIId authorizalion mechanisms. or by inferring
informaliOIl from dat,1 thcy have legitimate llccess 10 [7J.
allackers can obt<lin either access to. or learn private
informalion.
AI/ads 011 oum \'(liidiry: m,llicious clients can inject or
upd,lte corrupted streams Ihal can potcnti,IJly compromise
the accuracy of query answers on ,I stream or sel of
streams. Such allilcks are extremely difficult to defend
against and pOlcntial solUlions require corroburate in-
formation from multiple independent sources and often
depend on application semantics.
• Denial of .~en'ice: aUnckers can exhaust either tlte nvnil-
<lblc bandwidth or the dmnbasc servcr resources. pre-
venting legitimate clients from obtaining service. Al the
extreme, such atlacks can render the system unavailable.
As data stream applicntions process sensitive daln that is
often classified (military appliclltions) or private (financial,
health ilpplications, etc) Ihere is an obvious need for providing
security services not ooly for the llpplications but for the data
stream systems themselves. A comprehensive survey of secu-
rity <lnd priv,lcy requirements and open issues for a particular
type of stream datnbase (sensor datahases) is presented in [8].
Below we preselll the milin securily services that any slream
data syslem concerned with security should consider:
• Amhcmicatioll: authenticates a eliem when il requests
access to the system.
Acces~- cOllflvl alld awlwriZ.l/Iioll: checks if a given
c1ienl is authorized to register/update data s!re<lms or
perform queries on streams. Different streams can have
differem access control and aUlhorization mechanisms.
AUlhemicated clients can have different access control
and ,lIIthorization credentinls.
• Vara cOlljidemirlliry: gu,lrantees that only intcnded parties
can understand the content of the stream. the (Iuery. or
the result.
• Vara integrilY: ensures that data is in the fonn 'IS intended
by originator ,md was nol comlpted unimemionally or
imenlionally.
Dara lloll-replldiariol1: ensures that a party lhal performed
an operalion c,m not deny that hc did it. This service is
useful for audit purposes.
Da/ll primcr: dcfines what is the minimum information
that should be disclosed and provides ways of protecting
(personal) infonnalion even after it was disclosed to olher
parties.
Dara I'll/it/if)': by this we mean that thc datil stream
generated provides meaningful information. This service
t:,m be provided undcr a nnn-malicious model (like in
[9]), or under a malicious model.
• Sun'imlJilily: provides system recovery from either an
allaek or failure and ensures thaL a service is available.
• SCCljrilY po/icy: <Ill lhe ,Ibove security mechanisms musL
be govt:med by a security policy.
Most of tbe security requirements listed above arc not
necessarily spct:ific Lo data streams systems. However, sevt:ral
of lhem arc more difficult to provide for dala streams and
standard solutions can nm be directly "pplied. they require
additional research.
One challenge is rt:t:onciling application specific require-
ments with security services. in a lligh-demand environment.
For example, many applications require privacy of data. bill
also audit capabilily (for example medical <lpplic,ltions I JOn.
Some solutions proposed for lhis problem, relying on public
key encryption! 111. [121. provide a\l(!it capabilities while prc-
serving priv<lcy. but the associated cost makes them prohibitivc
to rca I-time dat<l stream systems.
Another challenge uriginates from the conflict hetween
sccurity and real-time processing thal can impact several ser-
vices. For access control and authorization lhe fine-granularity
can havc a negalive effect un the real-time proccssing. An-
other example is providing data confidcntiality. For example.
good candidates 10 provide confidenti,llity are stream ciphers
[131 because they arc highly efficient. However, data can be
dropped or lost eithcr aL the COllllllllllicatioJl leld bec<lllsc
of the high-rmc ,md data can not be rccovered, or at the
application lel'd bccause of limited storage capability and
processing power. For stream ciphers, the impact will he the
de-synchronization betwcen the key-stream and the encrypled
data <lnd will rcsulL in incorrect decryplion of the whole
sLream, w,lsting handwidlh and processing power. Wc would
like to point out lhat block ciphers are not immune to this
problem eilhcr. They are recommended to he used in ent:l)'p-
tion modes th,lt also require datil reliability.
B. Ollr FOCIIS
In Ihis paper wc investigate the relation between security
and f,lUlt-tolerance in the context on data streams, focusing
on data confidentiality. Our ncw contribUlions arc:
• Wc identify security service.~ for dat,1 strcams systems and
propost: a secure architecLure for a d<l\a stream system.
Nile l5j. [61.
• We focus on a parlicuhlr scrvice. d<lta confidentiality. We
show why current mechanisms fail Lo address the require-
menls of real-time data streams and design a mt:t:hanism.
called Ff-RC4. based on the RC4 stream cipht:r. We
evaluate its overhead and show how it perfonns in a lossy
environment.
We discuss implementation issues of Ff-RC4 in Nile
and show its performance over querics wifh different
requirements.
• We discuss applicability of FT-RC4 to other security
services, such as providing priv<lcy through processing
of encrypted d<lta.
Thc remainder of thc paper is organizcd as follows. Wc
overview related work in Set:tion II. We dest:ribe how lhe se-
curity services presented in Section I-A can he accommodated
in Nile, a stream dalabase management systcm. We present the
design of Fl~RC4 in Seclion IV. Section V shows how our
mech<lnisms performs wilhin Nile. Finally. we conclude this
work <lnd discuss several futurt: work directions in VI.
II. REl.ATED WORK
In lhis section we overview rdated work in several areas
related to security for data streams in panicular and database
in general.
a) Sf!cwil)' for Sirealll D(l/abases: To Lhe best of our
knowledge there is vel)' lillie work lhal focuses on the security
requirements and services for data streams. A significant work
in this dirt:ction is the work in [H] Lhat overvit:ws the main
research dircctions and challengcs in security for database
sensor nelworks. The paper points uut among olher issues the
need for robust sccurity mech<lnisms. i.e. mech<lnisms thaL not
only provide security services. but arc also faulHolcranl.
b) Acce~·~· COII/rol for Dmabase !:J)·srem.l': Significant
work was done in the are,1 of providing ,!t:t:ess control to
databilsc systems [14]. Some of the work focused on investi-
galing how several access control models can bc applied to
databases (for example RBAC [15]). Another topic in this
area focuses on providing access control [J 6], protection and
adminislration [{J XML d<lta sourccs 1171. More recent results
analyze what arc thc requirements ,md mechanisms that need
to be provided in query processing, in order to provide very
fine-grained access control (at the level of individual tuples)
lIS).
c) SearchiJlK and QIlCl)';llg Ellcl)plcd Data: Anothcr
lopic of interesl is privacy preservalion. In this category work
was conducted in a model where the servt:r is not trusted to
see the original data, in other words data is storcd by servers
in encrypted form. In lhe casc servers are not trusted also to
process the dat<l. there is a need for algoriLhms able to process
encrypted data. Some of the sccllfity issues lll<lt arc raised
when querying encrypted dala arc dist:ussed in [19]. Methods
to execute queries arc proposed in [20J and [21]. The first
shows how SQL queries can be perfonned ovcr encrypted datil
B. Seclfriry Archilectllre
through this interface. The Suenm MllJlo~C'r componcnt han-
dles multiple incoming streams ,Illd acts as a bulTer between
the streams source.~ and the Slream Qllery EI/gi"e. The main
funclion of the Stream Mal/ager is to register new stream-
,Iccess requests (Iueries). retrieve datil from the regislere(j
streams into local stream buffers. and supply data to the query
engme.
The STream QlIC'ry III leT/ace component is used 10 register
new snap-shot or continuous queries. Snap-shot queries are
queries that ,lre executed once over the current data, whereas
the continuolls queries are queries that reside in the system and
are continuously re-evaluated to produce stream of results. In
some silUations the Sucom SOl/rce Imerjm'e and the Sueom
Qller)' IlIreT/ace Cilll he the same.
The Srorage M{l/I(I~er is respunsihle for building and main-
taining summaries over data streams, allowing the system to
answer queries related to past data. SUllllll<Jries arc maintained
at different granularities such th,lt most recent data will have
summaries huilt at a finer levcl whereas the old data will have
summaries huilt at a coarser level.
The Srream Qllery Engine component is empowered with
certain capabilities <Jnd features that allow fast and efficient
processing of the stre'lm. For example. new access methods
,Ire defined such as Stre,lmScan (SScan) to allow efficient non-
blocking pipeline execlltion. The engine also suppons new
SQL operators such as Window 0rerator (W-Exp) that allow
the user to limit his/her interest of the data 10 a specific ]lCriod
of time. The W-Exp operator is the only operator that is aware
of the time and it keeps track of the new hems that enter
the interesting window and of the expired items that le<Jve
the current window. More details about the query processing
rnedr.:misms of Nile c<Jn be found in rs].
The current arehitecture of Nile docs not provide any
security service. Taking into account the ,lrchitccture and
functionality of Nile we reason ahout which of the security
services discussed in Section I-A are relevant and needed for
Nile and how can they be provided.
In figure 2 we propose a generic secllrity architecture for
Nile. Two new modules arc added. The role of the first module
is to handle authentication, encryption. integrity and non-
repudiation services. The re,lson we grouped them together is
because sometimes well-known standards or protucols provide
all of them or a subsel. This module is responsihle for
authenticating clients, performing key management, integrity
and encryption/decryption operations.
The second module <ldded is the Access COll/ro/ (lIId AII-
rllOriz.atioll Mallager that is responsible for making sure that
input streams, queries or results are performed by authorized
c1iems.
One important aspect is how a decision is made with
respect to the security policy. Both server and client can define









fig. L Nile system architecture
where the query processing is partitioned such thal most of Ihe
processing happens at the server sile, while the latter relies
on indexing infonnation attached 10 the encrypted datahase
to halance [he trade off between efficiency ami protection re-
quirements. More recent work proposes encryption algoritlllllS
tllal preserve order for numeric dala [22].
We would like [0 puint out other signific,mt work addressing
Ihc general problem of searching on encrypted data. Some
solutions proposed for this problem. rely on public key encryp-
lion [II]. [121. white olllen; rely on symmetric encryption to
achieve similar goals [23]. The work in [23] allhough efficient
because it relies on symmetric cryplograplly, has the drawback
that the search is linear with the size of tlle document. The
work in [24J improves over [23] by using tree slmctllres to
avoid the linear scalahility.
d) Digiwl Rit:hrs Mallagemem jor DaUlbases: Another
security service that was addressed in the cOl\text of dat,lbases
is rights prOlection. Work in this direction focused in providing
rights protection for relational dat,lbase systems [2S1 and more
recently on designing resilient schemes that achieve rights
protection for sensor streams [26].
111. A SECURITY ARCHITECTUI{E FOR NILE DBMS
In Ihis section we discuss how security services presented in
Section I-A can be accommodated in Nile, a stream database
milnagement system. We first provide an overview of Nile,
then present the proposed security architecturc.
A. Nile Archirecmre
Nile is a stream database management system designed and
developed at Purdue University. It is buill over a relational
datahase management system called PREDATOR [27j and
provides support for processing of continuous and snap-shot
queries over data streams.
Nile is ,I centralized system IIsing a client-server architec-
ture. Several clients can comnlllllic<Jte with the system; each
client can send multiple input streams and receive one or more
outplll streams as a response to queries. Each output stream
from the server corresponds 10 a query requested hy a client.
The same client can send input streams and receive output
streams. or one client is only sending data and another client
is querying tIle data and receiving the Olllput stream.
Figure I shows the main architectural components of Nile.
The Stream Type lllleFface component is the interface between
the streams generators (i.e. sellsors, retail stores. etc) and the



















Fig. 3. Effcct "r Inss on RC4
fig. 2. A security ard,itecllIrc for Nile
piclurc on Lhe len, and the decry pled piclure on the righl.
As Cilll be seen the effect is devastating. Becausc of only 3
byles lost. almostlhe whole picLure is losl. We performed Lhe
Sllme leSI over a lPG file (which is more compressed and less
resislilnl to byLe changes) and we noticed lhal Ihe decrypted
file was so significanlly compromised thai the picture could
noL be displayed. Finally, we also performed severallesls using
ASCII te;>;!. Wilh only J hyte 10SI, the result was lhal 80 % of
the text WllS meilninglcss.
In lhis work we chose to demonslrate how em:ryp!ion can
he provided for systems operaling in a lossy or high-rale
environmenl in which data is IOSI or dropped because of
limited buffer capabiliLy. or il can nOI be recovered because
Ihe real-Lime conslmints. We show how a well-known stream
cipher can he adapled to operate in such an environment.
IV. FI'-RC4 DESIGN
First we will give a description for RC4 illgorithm, and
demonstraLe wilh an eXilmple what happens in Cilse data is
1051. We lhen describe our modification to RC4 to m,lke II
more resilient to loss.
It. O~'en'i('1I' of RC4
RC4 is a slream cipher Ihilt is designed 10 encrypL and
decrypt sLream of bils, so it processes the message as a slream
of bits. Slfeam ciphers are fasL and have as cenlral mechanism
lhe generation of a key-slream (based on a shared secret
key) IhilL is then XOR-ed with Ihe plaintext. The decryption
operaLion is similar with the encryption operiliion.
RC4 uses an internal array S of size 256, and it slores villucs
in range 0..255 with some sWilpping hetween the values. The
encryption conLinues shufning lhe ,trray S values and finally
slims two enlries 10 gel lhe desired key.
One of lhe disildvilntages of sLream ciphers when used in
lossy environmenls is thallhey ilre prone to de-synchronization
between the key~sLream and the ciphertext. If such il de-
synchronizalion occurs, decryplion of the whole stream fails
and bandwidth and processing power is wasted. To demon-
strale this behavior we run lhe following experimelll, We
creale a [ass of 3 bytes (randomly) in a liMP file and lry
to decipher Lhe received dala. Figure 3 presenls the original
/1. FT-RC4 Descriplion
Faull tolerant RC4 (Fr-RC4) is bllsed on RC4 design. and il
uses Ihe Silme stremll key generation techniquc. RC4 can not
handle losing ilny data beLween lhe source and Ihe destination,
and if some of the data is dropped then lhe whole stream
(after Ihe (irst loss) wiII nOI be decrypled correctly due to
the shift in lhe key generiltion. Also lhe current RC4 can lloL
even deleeL thaL lhere is lost data, bUl relics on underlying
communication prolocols 10 achieve this. Although appropriate
for other applications, lhe assumption is nOI correct for streams
for several reasons; data is gone and can not be recovered (or
is nOI relevilnt i1nymore), or dala is drorred al Ihe receiver
end hecmlse of limited buffer and processing capabililies.
The main idea of FT·RC4 is 10 synchronize lhe byles in the
message by adding synchronizalion bils before the encryption
of the message. The deerypLion algorilhm will then check on
these synehronizalion bils to detect any dilta loss and Iry to
recover from the loss (re-synehronize lhe keysLream).
The descriplion of Ff·RC4 is presented in Algorilhm 1. Lei
us assume thaL our original message Ihat we need 10 encrypl
is M, and the lenglh of M is L. Fr-RC4 first expands Ihe
message by padding a specific number of synchronization bits
II after every specific number of biL~ from lhe original message
M, so all Iransmilled unils in J.H now carry synchronization
bils. The synchronization bits simply form a counter which
starts from 0 and reset whenever il reaches ils maximum (2"-
1), where II is lhe number of synchroniz<ltion bits.
The expanded message will be "1' and liS lenglh will be
L', where r: > L. FT-RC4 Ihen encrypts i\I' using lhe same
RC4 encryption leehnique, and sends Ihe rcsuiled cipher texi
C 10 the destinalion. The deslination then will decrypl lhe
message C to get M', blll after decrypting cvery transmilled
c"",,..n ••" ....... RC' ..... nRc<








lhe olle in RC4 hy adding the expansion phase ,md pauding the
SYIlchronization bilS before the encryption. and Ihe decryption
in Ff-RC4 is modified over the one in RC4 by adding
the checking aod recovering phase. FT-RC4 uses the same
technique for the slream key schcdule. which is eflicient due
10 its simplicity.
C. FT-RC4 Jil'aillalioll
We evaluate how resilient is Ff-RC4 by comparing its
pcrformance in a lossy environment with the standard RC4,
ami measure how efficicntly can Ff-RC4 recovcr from !he loss
of bytes hetween the source and the destination. The evaluation
is uone over lext ami images.
Text: We compared both techniques over text data
streams. \Ve SCi Ihc loss tale 10 be .. percent of the input
data size (i.e. 1'70 and 5'70 ) and the losl bytes will be selected
uniformly form the input file. For a text of ..bout 700 words,
with a I% loss, RC4 fails to recover the text correctly after I
byte is los\. while Ff-RC4 rccovers very quickly.
III/(/ge: We set the loss rate to bc a percent of lhe input
data size (i.e. 1% and 5% ) and the lost bytes were unifonnly
sc1ccled from lhe inpul file. We protected the header parl
untouched, because the header part of a file specifies its type,
so it can be opened by the correct application. If any loss
or damage occurs in the header pari, the entire file will be
unreadable even if the remaining part is correct. Also if we
assume thai the data loss occurs in the applications layer,
it is practical th,lt these applica!ion handle the header parts
carefully since they are critical.
We compared the ,llgoridlms over JPEG liles, which are
more compressed and less resist,lIlt to byte changes. Figure 4
presents an original picmre compareu with the results of its
encrypledJdecrypteu wiLh RC4 and FI'..RC4 for. As it can be
seen wilh only 1% loss, RC4 fails to recover Ihe image, while
Ff-RC4 is still able 10 show lhe image when loss is 5 %. AI a
I% loss where RC4 fails. Ff-RC4 recovers the picture aimosl
in its original quality. With a 1051 of higher than 1% RC4 fails.
FT-RC4 Overhead: We compared lhe performance of
the slandaru RC4 and our Ff..RC4 with respect to the time
required by thc algorilhm to perform Ihe encryption and
decryption operations. Figure 5 shows the performance results.
111e figure shows thai hath techniques linearly increase with
the file size, bUl Ff..RC4 has a higher slop. The measurements
Algorithm 1 FI'..RC4 descr"'PC'O'O~",-- _
Key Schcdule:




j = (j + Sri] + kli mod L])(mou 256)
swap (S[ij, SliD
Encryption:
i ==j == 0
for each byte mi in message M
i == (i + I) (mod 256)
j = (j + Sri]) (mou 256)
swap(Slil, Sli))
t == (S[i] + Sli)) (mou 256)
Ci = mi XOR S[ll
Decryption:
i==j==()
for each byte ci in messngc C
i == (i + I) (mod 256)
j == U+ SliD (mod 256)
swap(S(iJ. SUD
I = (S[i) + SUD (mod 256)
mi == ci XOR StU
-check mi to scc if it is the expectcu one?
il'YES
remove s}'nch. bits from this byte
else
figure OIH how many bits are 10SI. shift
the stream key, and injcct zero-bits.
unit it mUSI check whether that unit is Ihe expccted one, or
Ihat unit arrived out of ordcr and there was d,lla loss. This
information can be obtained from the synchronization hilS.
If Ihere is no data loss and th,11 was Ihe expected unit. Ihe
algorithm removes Ihe synchroniz,uion bilS, and continues the
decryption. If the decryplion algorithm ueteets data loss, then
it has !O delect how many bits are lost anu start shifting the
key stream by the same value to resynchronize the message
bils with the stream key. In case the resynchronlzalioo does
not take place then thc whole stream after the firsl loss will
he garbage.
We nOle thnt it is not enough to detect the loss and shift
the key stream; the algorithm also needs to recover from Ihe
loss. The algorithm musl also readjust bytes bounuaries of Ihe
original message M because thc losl data may not be mul!iple
of bytes. In this case although the uecryption is corrcc\. most
applications reading the data in bytes or words will not he ahle
to read the data (i.e. texi edilors, audio ,1IlU viueo applications,
images, etc). FT..RC4 handles this issue hy injecling bils (set
10 zero) instead of the lost ones, this way readjusting byles
boundaries such thai appJiea!ions al the uestinatioll can read
the message nonnally.
To summarize, the encryption in Ff..RC4 is modified over
Origin~1 FT-RC4: lSi loss Ff-RC4: 5 % loss
1-.1
RC4: I % loss
Fig.~. Ff·RC4 R~sili""c~
SELECT SUM(RI.txn.PriceO '" R l.txn.QuanlilyO)
FROM Relaill RI
WHERE Rl.lxn.ltemlD = 15
WINDOW 00.00.05.00:
show lhat FI'-RC<I almost lakes double lhe time Iaken hy RC4.
The reason is Ihal Fr-RC4 performs t\\'o illorc operalions over
lhe slream which are the expansion pl1<l~c 10 augment Ihe
synchronization bit~ in lhc encryplion, ami the compaction
philse 10 remove the synchronizalioll bits in lhc dccryp!inn.
V. INTEGRATION 01' FT-RC4 IN NtLE
In this section we pre~ent performance resulls and di~cus~
~cvcral aspects at' Ihe irllegration of FT-RC4 in Nile.
A. Expcrilllems ill Lossy EI/l'imlllllelll~'
We implemenled RC4 and FT-RC4 protocols inside Ihe Nile
system by adding a security layer (encryption and decryplion)
oclween Ihe c1ienls and lhe server. such that both entilies
cither usc the slandard RC<I or use Ihe FT...RC<I. We evalu:Hed
the performance of lIle system in a lossy cnvironment by
demonstraling the performance of RC4 and Ff-RC4 using a
retail slore npplieation [6] lhal sends a Slream of transactions
generated from 5 retail store~. each transaction consisling of
< Sl(}rl:'! n. flemI D, Price. Qluwlil y. TimeStamp >.
Firsl, Ff-RC4 is evaluated over a simplc qucry presemed
in Figure 6. The mcaning of the query is (0 select Ihc sum
of (he product of the price and the quanlity from thc ~trcam
Ret,.ilI where the item ifemID equals to 15 and the window
of interest is of size 5 second~. The windnw operator has
~yntax \Vindow hh,mm,ss,uu; where h means hours, m means
minule~. s means seconds, and u means microsceonds.
We executed the query undcr los~ rate~ of I'lv, 5% and 10%.
Figure 7 shnws the results generated from the system for qucry
Q I. with Figure~ (a), (h) and (c) corresponding 10 Ihe three
different lo~s rate~, 1%, 5% and 10%. respectively. Figure 7
shows that lhe qucry rcsult changes over lime as new items
arrive inside thc window of interest and old items expire from
Ihe window. As it c,m be noticed. the RC4 protocol simply
t:111s to process the strcam ,md "fter Ihe first loss. it crashes Ihe
system a~ il starts producing garbage. Thi~ is the reason why
the line represenling the RC4 prolOcoI in Figure 7, (a), (b) amI
(c) stops afler several readings. On the other hand, it can be
noticed that Ff-RC4 i~ vcry resistant to losses, and although
it docs nol produce Ihe oplimal results due to replacing lhe
losl value~ with 0_ it still preserves lhe stream-s hehavior and
produces acceplable results.
For query QI. Ihe effect of the loss is limilcd only to items
wilh ItemlD equals to IS, so any loss Ihal occurs 10 value.~
relaled to other item~ will not alfecllhe query rcsult. To make
lhe query more sensitive to losses we modified the query
(described in Figure 8). by removing the lVHERE elau~c
from QI. This way, any lo~~ ovcr the selected columns in
the query will aft'ecl lhe query rc~ults. We executed the query
under loss rales of 1%,5% and 10%. Figure 9 shows the results
generated from the system for query Q2. with Figures (a), (b)
and (c) l:orresponding 10 the Ihree differclllloss rates, 1%.5%
and 10%, respectively. Figure 9 shows that RC4 h,,~ vCI)' poor
performance even under a low loss rate, while Fr..RC4 ha~ a
high resistance to lo~se~ and it produces meaningful re~ults.
finally. we evalualed lhe FI'-RC<I prolOcol over a more
complex query involving lWO dala ~lIeams. The query Q3
descriplion i~ pre~ented in Figure 10, while the resuils are
presented in Figure 11. In Figure II (a) it is assumed thaI
holh slreams have Ihe same loss rate which is 10%. while in
Figure II (h) it is assllmcd that bolh streams have different
lo~s rales, 10% and 20% respcctively. Figure 11, again shows
that RC4 fails immedintcly. while Ff-RC4 behaves wcll in
both ea~es.
B. Adoplillg Ff-RC4 10 Srream Hales
11 should be notcd that Ff-RC4 can <llso fail 10 decipher
data correctly if thc strellm looses one complete cyclc. The
size of a cycle depends on the number of synchronization
bits used in the prolocol. For eXlimple, if the protocol IIse~
n synchronization bils then the eycle size equals to 2n. In
this ease. if at any time Ihc server losses one complete cycle
of conliguous unils, (hen Ihe FI'-RC<I will fail to deteci and
re-synchronize the keystream correclly.
In this section we propose an adaptive scheme by which Ihe
Ff-RC4 can change the number of synchronization bits ~uch
lhat it minimizes Ihe transmission overhead and at lhe ~ame
time il will be able to cope with pcak losses thal lIlay occur
from time 10 lime over lhe slream. We will dcmonstrate the
·.. ~ _..'
(a) I % loss
(b) 5 '70 loss
···0,'.'·' .'".-.' •..."" ••• , •.• "L-_
(l:) ](J % loss
Fig. 7. R~sulls for qu~'1' QI
SELECT SUM(R I.lxn.Pril:l:O * Rl.txn.QuanlilYO)
FROM Retaill R I
WINDOW 00.00.05.00;
Fig:. II. Q\J~f)' Q2 l1~sniplion
impooanl:l: of the adaptalioll schern<l lIsing a new query Q3,
over the same applic,lIion <IS in previous sectioll.
In some applications Ihe lr,msmission of the data is in lhe
form of packets, each packetl:onsists of a payload that conlains
the ill:tu<l1 data and other additional header fields to hold
l:l:Oain informalion necessary for lhe transmission. In such
applil:ittions adding olle byle in eal:h pal:keL to he used (aL
the application level) as synduollizatioll bils in the Fr-RC4 is
sufficient and the overhead is acceptable. But in many Slrl:ilm
applicalions such as sensor nelworks the Iransmission of the
data is unslmclUred, it can be a stream of inlegers, characlers.
ctc. Therefore for this type of applications il is clear thallising
onl: byte or fixed number of bils with eaeh transmitted IIl1it
wil] involvl: it high and somelimes unacl:eplable overhead.
(n) I % loss
(b) 5 % loss
(c) 10 % loss
Fill. 9. RC.llIIIS for qucry Q2
SELECT R l.lxn.QuantitYO+R2.txn.QualllityO
FROM Retail! Rl, Relail2 R2
WHERE R l.txn.hemJDO = R2.lxn.ltemlDO
WINDOW 00,00. [0,00;
Fill. 10, Qu~'1' Q3 dC5njp\ion
The purpose of Ihe adaptation is to ,Il:hieve two goals:
(l) usc a minimal number of synchronization bil~, (2) avoid
loosing one complete cycle of subse(IUl:nt units. The proposed
melhod is as follows:
I) Initially whl:n clienL C registers wilh thl: server to slarl
sending dala, the client infonns the Sl:rver about the
expel:ll:d sending rate R,
2) The server calculates the overalilrallsmission rate in the
system al the currenl moment. and based on the aVililable
resources. the server estimates the overall lose rate S.
3) The server divides Saver lhe streams according to their
sending rale ratios. Let's assume lhal c1ienl C is going to
suffer a loss rale (number of p<lckl:ts per second) equal
10 L. In Lhis case. the server sends a message 10 cliem C
(a) Slream I and Stream 2 !O'lo loss
(b) Strcam J 10% loss and Strc<lm 2 20% loss
'"'' •. ,. c. 0 •••• " ,._. "~,..."_,,,,,~","• ., .. ,, ......,,,."-
rig. 12_ Elfcrl of adapling Fl~Rc.l 10 5Ir~';Im rale
10 sctthe number of synchronizatiun hits to /O!l(f..) + 1
such lhilt no cycle can occur without the server delecting
the loss.
4) Since thc strcam rate can change ovcr time: hurst. normal
or low, then thc server periodically performs steps (2)
and (3) to adnpl lhe number of the synchronizalion bits
to the currect state of thc stream.
5) '1b avoid Iran sit periods, the server will not assumc thal
the client is using lhc new value for the synchroniz,ltion
bits until the diem sends back a message to can linn lhc
change.
To show the imparlance of the adaptation scheme we
perfonned the following experiment using query Q3 described
in Figure 10. In the experiment il is assumed that 5rreal11 1
(Rerui/ 1) has .. moderate arrival rale ,md loss rate selto 10%.
while Stream /1 (Relai/ll) has a very high arrival rale and
loss r,lte set to 40%, and we forced Suet/III " to loss from
time to time 5 subsequelll byles. Figurc 12 shows the result of
query Q3 umJcr two scenarios. In the first scenario there is no
adaptation, and all clients use fixed numbcr of synchroniz;lIion
bils (se! 10 2). In lhe second scenario the adaptation will allow
the server to ask Ihe client sending 5tr('(/1/1 II (Q use more
sym:hronizalion bits (set to 3) as Ihe server knows thai il
may loose more than 4 subsequem bytes. The results show
that hefore tlle loss of ,my 5 suhsequenl bytcs buth scenarios
produce exaelly lhe same results. However, after the first loss
of 5 subse{IUcnt bytes, Ff-RC4 f..ils in the firsl scen..riu as it
looscs thc synchronizalion and stans producing garbage. while
lhe Fr·RC4 in Ihe second scenario performs well and is able
10 COpl: the loss.
C. Using Ff-RC4 for Offler SCClIrily Sen1ices for Streams
There are other sccurity services that we believe can benefit
from I'I~RC4. One such service is providing data privacy,
while mainlaining audit capabilities. In such a service the
scrvers are nOI tnlsted. so dienL~ will inplll data in encrypled
foml. However, there is <I necd 10 he able to do search on the
cncrypted dala, a.nd sometimcs lo he able to delegate certain
kcyword search capnbilitics to authorized parlies.
Rcccnt results [J 11, [12] addrcssing the problem of search-
ing un cncrypled data providcs rely on public key encryp-
tion. Although appropriatc fur off~line logging <lnd tradilional
datab<lses. their cost is prohibitivc for data slreams. More
appropriate schemes for dala streams are schemes that use
symmetric encryption, in pnrticular slream ciphers. In fact a
scheme like that was proposed ill the past [23], having in foclls
cmail a~ the targel application. The scheme proposed in [23]
can bc adapted for dala streams. particularly bceause of lhe
reduced comple:dty of both data and operalions that can be
perfonncd on streams. When used in lossy environments, the
scheme will suffer from the same problems a~ RC4. Therefore.
we belicve lhilt the same synchronization lechllique wc used
for data confidentiality. can be applied to make symmetric-
b..sed searching on encrypted streams robust to faults. We
would like 10 explore the topic in the future and apply it 10
sc\'erdl stream applications with different environments and
security requirements.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we focused on security services for data
streams. More precisely, we fucused on data confidentiality
based on stream ciphers and on the interaction between fault-
tolerance ,md securily. \Ve show how current stream schemes
Iilil to decipher correclly when dc-synchronization between
the ciphertext and the keyslream happens because of lossy
environmellls or inability of the application to process thc
incoming slreams. We proposed a modification to a well-
known stream cipher RC4. to cope with the problem, We
showed how the modificd scheme, referred ..s Ff~RC4 ad-
dresses the problem. huw can be Ilsed as a building block
for a security architeclure fur Nile. a datn stream database
syslem and presented results for several queries with different
requirelllellls <lilt.! lo~~ rale~. Fillally we discuss how other
seeuril), services such as privacy call henefit from FT-RC4.
\Ve also t.!iscussed how our scheme can be made adaplive.
Although the scheme we proposed is not very comple:-;,
the resulls we prcseotet.! int.!icme the henefils thai C'1II be
ohlained. We woult.! like In lhe fmure 10 design more so-
phislicated adaptive <llgorilhms Ihal arc rohusl 10 faulls while
slill providing the security service !hey were designed for. III
addition, we \\'ollld like 10 explore symmetric-based privacy
preserving schemes, in Ihe Silme conlexl of data slreams, nnd
experimenl Wilh several stre<lm <lpplic<lIIOnS operming under
differem cnvlronmem conSlr:linlS and having t.!iffcrem security
rC{luirements.
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